





In recent years, much work has been dedicated by logicians, computer
scientists and economists to understanding awareness, as its importance for
human behaviour has become evident. Although logics of awareness have
been proposed, little work has been done on change in awareness, despite
the importance of awareness change in situations of decision and interac-
tion. The aim of this paper is to make a start on this problem. It proposes,
ﬁrstly, a versatile model of awareness and awareness change, and secondly,
logics for awareness and awareness change developed using this model. The
logic of awareness is similar to that proposed by Halpern (Games and Eco-
nomic Behavior, 37 (2001) 321–339); two logics of awareness change are
developed, following the two paradigms in belief revision (Alchourron et al,
The Journal of Symbolic Logic 50 (1986) 510–530; van Benthem, Journal
of Applied Non-classical Logics 17 (2007) 129–155).
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1Brian Hill Dynamic Awareness
People lack awareness of various issues at particular moments. As you read
the previous sentence, you were not perhaps aware of the question of whether the
capital of Chile is Santiago, or of the sentence “the capital of Chile is Santiago”.
Moreover, one’s states of awareness change, and rather often: the awareness of
the capital of Chile, which you lacked two sentences ago but have now, is but an
example. Finally, awareness (or lack of it) is an important property of people’s
epistemic states at particular moments, with signiﬁcant consequences for the de-
cisions they make, their actions, and their behaviour in situations of interaction. It
is this importance which has recently drawn the attention of computer scientists,
logicians and game theorists, and has led to several models and logics of aware-
ness being proposed. (See Halpern (2001); Modica and Rustichini (1999); Heifetz
et al. (2006) for introductions to the notion of awareness, to the importance and
uses of the notion and for logics and semantics of awareness). However, little
work has been done to date on change of awareness, despite the fact noted above
that awareness changes quite frequently, and despite the obvious consequences
of such changes for behaviour. The aim of this paper is make a start at ﬁlling
this gap, by developing a model of awareness and of changes in awareness. That
is, a formal way of representing an agent’s epistemic state at a given moment
which accurately captures the awareness properties of that state, and a formal set
of operations which accurately capture the effect of change in awareness on his
state. It is naturally hoped that these models will be of use to decision theorists
and game theorists, and perhaps to philosophers looking to get a formal grip on
agents’ instantaneous states; in any case, in the development of the model, some
philosophical and methodologies issues concerning awareness and the project of
understanding epistemic states shall be discussed. Finally, on the basis of the
model, logics will be proposed for awareness and awareness change. For the case
of awareness, it will be shown how these models provide a new semantics for a
widely accepted existing logic of awareness. For the case of awareness change,
two sorts of logics will be proposed, mimicking the two paradigms for formal
study of belief revision: the AGM-paradigm (Gärdenfors, 1988; Gärdenfors and
Rott, 1995; Hansson, 1999) and the Dynamic Epistemic Logic or DEL paradigm
(van Benthem, 2007; van Ditmarsch, 2005).
In Section 1, a model of an agent’s state of knowledge, encompassing aware-
ness, shallbeproposed, andoperatorsonthismodelrepresentingchangeofaware-
ness shall be deﬁned. In Section 2, the logic of awareness and awareness change
shall be tackled: both AGM-style postulates for awareness and a DEL-style logic
of awareness and awareness change shall be proposed.
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1 The model
1.1 A model of knowledge and awareness
We, the theorists, know that he, the agent under study, is unaware of certain sen-
tences.1 The sentences available to the theorist are not all available to the agent:
the languages at their disposal differ. This poses a problem for any theorist wish-
ing the construct a model correctly representing the agent’s state of knowledge: is
this model to be constructed in the agent’s language or in the theorist’s language?
This question is equally important for the project of proposing a logic of knowl-
edge and awareness: if, for example, the agent lacks the concepts of knowledge
or awareness, the logic of his language will be signiﬁcantly poorer than that of the
theorist wishing to talk about these questions.
In this section, a model of the agent’s epistemic state which pays close at-
tention to the language the agent has at his disposal at the moment in question,
leaving the theorist’s language unformalised in the background. In Section 2, log-
ics shall be proposed: these logics, and particularly those developed in Sections
2.2 and 2.3 will be expressed in the theorist’s language, which will be suitably
formalised for the purpose.
Simple agents As stated above, the model of the agent’s state of knowledge
(and awareness) presented here will take the agent’s point of view. It will repre-
sent his knowledge expressed in his own language, so to speak. This model has
already been extensively discussed and defended in Hill (forthcoming) where it
was applied to belief revision. Its presentation here shall thus be brief.
The basic notion is the following.
Deﬁnition 1 (Interpreted Algebra). An interpreted algebra B is a triple (BI; B;q),
where BI is the free Boolean algebra generated by a set I (the interpreting alge-
bra),2 B is an atomic Boolean algebra (the base algebra),3 and q : BI ! B is a
surjective Boolean homomorphism.
An element of B is a pair (;q()),  2 BI. Elements of an interpreted algebra
shall be referred to (without risk of confusion) by the appropriate elements of
the interpreting algebra, and shall often be called “sentences”. Note that there is a
Boolean structure on the set of elements of B, induced by the Boolean structure on
1Following recent practice, we shall suppose awareness to apply to sentences.
2A Boolean algebra is a distributed complemented lattice; the order will be written as 6, meet,
join, complementation and residuation as ^;_;:;!. The free Boolean algebra generated by a set
X shall be noted as BX for the rest of the paper; details on this and other notions used in this paper
may be found in Koppelberg (1989).
3Standard terminology is employed here: an atom of a Boolean algebra is an element a 2 B,
such that, for all x 2 B with ? 6 x 6 a, either x = ? or x = a.
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the interpreting algebra BI; the ordinary Boolean connective symbols ^;_;:;!
shall be used when speaking of this structure, with ^ and : taken as primitive for
the purposes of deﬁnitions and proofs.
The consequence relation )B for an interpreted algebra B is deﬁned as fol-
lows: for any elements ,   of (BI; B;q),  )B   if and only if q() 6 q( ). ,B
will designate the derived equivalence relation. The subscripts may be dropped if
they are evident from the context.
Interpreted algebras will be used to model the local logical structure the agent
has at his disposal at a given moment. Given that the agent is aware of only a
ﬁnite number of sentences at any moment, the interpreted algebra representing
the logical structure he is using at that moment can be assumed to be ﬁnite; this
assumption will hold throughout the paper. The interpreting algebra models the
local language effective at the moment in question – the language that the agent is
using at that moment. I is the set of sentences treated as primitive at that moment.
The base algebra is the local logic on this language – the logic the agent is pre-
supposing on his language at that moment. This is the part of the structure which
provides the consequence relation. Just as the elements of the interpreting algebra
may be thought of as the sentences of the local logical structure, the elements of
the base algebra may be thought of as the (local) propositions. Accordingly, q is
the map taking sentences to propositions, and may be thought of as the valuation
of the sentences of the language. Note that the atoms of the base algebra can be
thought of as “states” or “small worlds”: worlds in the sense that every sentence
of the local language receives a valuation in each world (thanks to q); small in
the sense that only the sentences of the local language receive any valuation in
these worlds. For a more detailed discussion and defence of this model, see Hill
(forthcoming).
Interpreted algebras represent the language and underlying logic in which the
agent his thinking. As such, they naturally capture the agent’s state of awareness,
via the fact that they represent explicitly the language he sees himself to be using
(at that moment): he is aware of the sentences in that language, and unaware
of sentences which do not belong to it. So, for example, the interpreted algebra
represening the language you were using just before beginning this paper may
have contained several sentences pertaining to logic, knowledge, awareness and
so on, but the sentence stating that Santiago is the capital of Chile was absent from
that algebra: thus your unawareness of it.
Moreover, interpreted algebras can also capture infractions of logical omni-
science, through the fact that the consequence relation is relative to the interpreted
algebra – and thus to the agent and the moment in question – and not ﬁxed inde-
pendently by the theorist. This relativity is worth noting because it will have some
important consequences below. The question of logical omniscience, however, is
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beyond the scope of the paper and shall not be discussed further; interested readers
are referred to Hill (forthcoming).
Interpreted algebras model the local logical structure employed by the agent
at a given moment, but they do not represent which of the sentences in question
he takes himself to know or believe.4 This can be represented by an element of
the algebra. We thus have the following structure:
Deﬁnition 2 (Pointed algebra). A pointed algebra is a pair (B;) where B =
(BI; B;q) is an interpreted algebra and  is an element of B such that  <B ?. 
will be called the knowledge element.
An agent knows  in (B;), if  )B . This model treats the agent’s knowl-
edge set as consistent and logically closed – relative to the notion of logical con-
sequence in play in that situation. Thus pointed algebras are deﬁned up to (local)
logical equivalence on the knowledge elements. Mapping the element  to the
set of atoms x 6 q(), one obtains a standard modal-logic model of knowledge
in terms of possible worlds (though small possible worlds); taking the ﬁlter gen-
erated by  (the set of sentences  such that  ) ), one obtains the standard
belief-revision model as a consistent set of sentences closed under logical conse-
quence (though local logical consequence).
So, to take an example, the pointed algebra modelling your state at the begin-
ning of this paper (which, recall, included several sentences pertaining to logic,
knowledge, awareness, and so on), had a knowledge element implying what you
took yourself to know (about these issues) at that moment. Quite probably, as
you read the second sentence of this article, the knowledge element of the pointed
algebra implied the sentence stating that Santiago is the capital of Chile: this cap-
tures the fact that you became aware of a sentence you knew to be true.
Reﬂective agents The agent modelled using the interpreted algebra of Deﬁni-
tion 1 has a propositional language. He therefore cannot express sentences regard-
ing (his own) knowledge or awareness; or more precisely, he cannot treat such
sentences as if knowledge or awareness were operators. This is because the un-
derlying algebra used is a Boolean algebra, the algebra of propositional logic. To
model an agent employing a richer language at a given moment requires a richer
algebra: for example, a modal language will require a modal algebra (or Boolean
algebra with operators, as it called in (Blackburn et al., 2001, Ch 5)). Given that
the theorist has a language with knowledge and awareness (as operators of the lan-
guage), and given that this is the subject of the paper, it is worth considering the
4From an internal point of view, which is the point of view taken at this stage of the paper, the
traditional notions of belief and knowledge coincide. See also §2.2.
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case of the agent which can talk about his current state of knowledge and aware-
ness at a particular moment. To model this, an algebra with two operators will be
required: one, the knowledge operator, will correspond to the logic S5 (the stan-
dard logic for knowledge); the other operator representing awareness and being,
as we shall see, essentially trivial.5 Such an algebra shall be called an epistemic
algebra.
Deﬁnition 3 (Epistemic algebra). An epistemic algebra B is a Boolean algebra
with two operators: f, the knowledge operator, which satisﬁes normality, mul-
tiplicativity, T, 4 and 5,6 and fa, the awareness operator, with fax = >, for all
x 2 B.
This can be used to deﬁne the notion of interpreted epistemic algebra, with a
richer structure than the Boolean interpreted algebra.
Deﬁnition 4 (Interpreted Epistemic Algebra). An interpreted epistemic algebra
B is a triple (BI; B;q), where: BI is the free epistemic algebra generated by a set
I (the interpreting algebra), B is an atomic epistemic modal algebra (the base
algebra), and q : BI ! B is a surjective epistemic homomorphism.7
The knowledge and awareness operators in the interpreting algebra shall be
respectively denoted by K and A, following the tradition. Elements and the con-
sequence relation are as in Deﬁnition 1.
Apointedepistemicalgebraisapair(B;)whereBisaninterpretedepistemic
algebra and  is an element of B, not )B-equivalent to ?, such that  )B K and
if  ;B  , then  )B :K .8
The remarks following Deﬁnition 1 hold here. K is the knowledge operator,
satisfying the ordinary S5 axioms;9 A is the awareness operator. With these op-
erators in the language, the agent can consider – and explicitly know – sentences
5For the purposes of this paper, we will only consider the agent’s ability to talk about his own
knowledge and awareness at that very moment. The case of the agent considering his past or future
states of knowledge or awareness, or the knowledge or awareness of others shall not be explicitly
considered; in particular, only the single-agent case is considered. Nevertheless the results in this
paper do not have nothing to say about this cases: generally speaking, they would be tackled along
the same lines as the investigation of the theorist’s understanding of the agent’s epistemic state in
Section 2.2.
6The ﬁrst two conditions correspond to the generalisation rule and the axiom K and are, respec-
tively, f> = > and f(x^y) = fx^ fy. See (Blackburn et al., 2001, Ch 5) (note however that they
take the diamond as primitive, whereas the box is taken as primitive here). The latter conditions
are the algebraic formulations of the standard axioms: for example, T is fx 6 x. Analogous points
to those made for Boolean algebras in footnote 2 apply to epistemic algebras.
7It preserves the Boolean connectives and the operators: for all  2 BI, f(q()) = q(f()).
8These conditions ensure that the knowledge set of the agent satisﬁes the ordinary S5 axioms
for knowledge
9Evidently, weaker knowledge operators can be dealt with in similar ways.
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pertaining to his own state of knowledge and awareness. Since the agent can only
consider those sentences of which he is aware, and he is aware of any sentence he
considers, the agent’s awareness operator in his local language at that moment is
trivial: for any sentence in his local language at that moment, just being in that
language implies that he is aware of it. Thus the condition on fa in the deﬁnition
of epistemic algebras.10
The major difference between the simple agent (modelled by an ordinary in-
terpreted algebra) and the reﬂective agent (modelled by an interpreted epistemic
algebra) lies in the fact that the latter can entertain sentences describing his own
state of knowledge or ignorance. Such expressive power is known to create com-
plications in the case of belief revision (Fuhrmann, 1989; van Ditmarsch, 2005).
In the case of awareness change, it implies (for classic S5 knowledge) that the
agent must know his attitude – of knowledge or ignorance – toward any new sen-
tence of which he becomes aware, and thus, in a certain sense, “gain” knowledge
on becoming aware of a new sentence. As we shall see, this is not the case for the
simple agent: he can become aware of a new sentence without gaining any new
knowledge whatsoever, apart from the (local) tautologies expressed using the new
sentence.
Despite this difference, all the results and remarks in the paper apply to both
cases, unless explicitly stated. There are three reasons for introducing and using
both the ordinary and epistemic algebras here. Firstly, it counts as an advantage
of this approach that it can deal with richer and poorer agent languages. Secondly,
it seems that both types of algebra are useful in different modelling situations
(sometimes one considers one’s state of knowledge, sometimes one is unaware
of it). Finally, different paradigms for modelling change have a preference for
different richnesses of language (see Section 2).
1.2 Changes of awareness
The sort of model proposed in Section 1.1 has been used to model belief change
(Hill, forthcoming). In this section, operators relevant for changes in awareness
shall be introduced.
Given that awareness is treated as a property of the interpreted (epistemic)
algebraratherthanspeciﬁcallyoftheknowledgesetexpressedinthisalgebra, only
operations on the algebra itself need be considered. Intuitively speaking, there are
two sorts of changes involving awareness, each of which can be captured with
operations on algebras: becoming aware of a sentence and becoming unaware of
a sentence. However, as shall be seen shortly, it shall be useful to factorise the
10For lack of space, we shall not use a more general deﬁnition, capable of accounting for un-
awareness at past or future moments, or awareness of others.
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ﬁrst sort of change into two sorts of operation.
Becoming aware If unawareness of a sentence  is represented as the absence
of  from the interpreted algebra modelling the agent’s state of knowledge, then
becoming aware of  should involve the extension of the interpreted algebra to
include . However, at ﬁrst glance, there are several interpreted algebras B0 that
contain B and , and indeed they correspond to different cases of becoming aware.
Forexample, whenyoubecameawareof thequestionofthecapitalofChilewhilst
reading a logic paper, the two issues were completely independent to each other.
On the other hand, when, whilst searching for the proof of a result, you become
aware of (or recall) a theorem, which allows you to conclude the desired result on
the basis of what you have already established, then this theorem does enter into
important logical relationships with that of which you were already aware (the re-
sult desired and those which you have already established). These differences are
reﬂected in the interpreted algebra in which your knowledge is couched after your
becoming aware – in the former case, the sentence about the capital of Chile does
not enter into any non-trivial logical relationships with other elements, whereas,
in the latter case, the theorem does. This range of ways of becoming aware poses
a challenge for a project of modelling and notably giving a logic for awareness
change: should they be modelled by a single non-deterministic becoming-aware
operation or a range of different becoming-aware operations? Neither of these
options is appetising: the ﬁrst ﬂies in the face of the idea that, just like the case
of coming to believe something, there should be one way for the agent to become
aware of something; the second keeps the determinism of the operation, but at the
price of a multiplication of becoming-aware operations which is difﬁcult compre-
hend. Fortunately, it shall be possible to avoid both of these options: the range
of possibilities shall be captured by factorising them into a single operation for
becoming aware, which does nothing but add a sentence to the local language,
and an operation for establishing logical relationships between sentences. There
is thus a determinate operation for becoming aware, but a range of ways of apply-
ing the second operation which establishes logical relationships between the new
sentences and the old. On the other hand, the understanding of cases of becoming
aware is economic insofar as it requires only two operations as opposed to a larger
range. The difference between the single deterministic becoming-aware operation
and the range of ways of becoming aware corresponding to compositions with
an operation of establishing logical relationships shall be brought out in the next
section, since logics shall be proposed for both.
The basic becoming-aware operation, called expansion, is a sort of “free” ex-
tension of the interpreting algebra: free in the sense that the language is simply
extended with no non-trivial logical structure added.
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Deﬁnition 5 (Expansion). The expansion of an interpreted (epistemic) algebra
B = (BI; B;q) by a sentence , call it B + , is deﬁned as follows: if  < BI,
B +  = (BI[fg; B0;q0), where B0 = B 
 Bfxg
11 and q0 is the unique (epistemic)
homomorphism such that, for   2 BI, q0( ) = q( ) and q0() = x. If  2 BI,
B +  = B.
The expansion of the pointed algebra (B;) by , written as (B;) + , is
(B + ;). Here and throughout the paper, the same symbol (in this case ) shall
be used both for the element of original algebra (B) and its image under the em-
bedding (in this case, the image in B + ), since the difference is clear from the
context. The expansion of the pointed (epistemic) algebra (B;) by , written as
(B;) + , is (B + ; ^
V
 2B;;  :K( _  ) ^ :K(: _  )).12
This may be seen as analogous to belief-revision theory’s expansion (Gärden-
fors, 1988):13 it simply adds the sentence  to the local language, without altering
anyotherlogicalstructure; accordingly, itdoesnotaltertheknowledgeset, except,
in the case of pointed epistemic algebras, to take account of the agent’s ignorance
of the new sentence. However, in many cases, the newly added sentence will enter
into logical relationships with existing sentences (in so far as they feature in the
local logical structure effective at that moment). To model this, the operation of
restriction will be used.
Deﬁnition 6 (Restriction). The restriction of an interpreted algebra B = (BI; B;q)
by , written B=, is (BI; B0;q0), where B0 = B=q() and q0 is the composition of
this quotient with q. The restriction of the pointed algebra (B;) by , written
as (B;)=, is (B=;), where, as above,  is used to refer to the image of the
knowledge element in B under the quotient map to B=.
11Recall (footnote 2 and 6) that Bfxg is the free Boolean (respectively epistemic) algebra gener-
ated by the single element x. The free product of (atomic) Boolean algebras is the Boolean algebra
whose set of atoms is the Cartesian product of the sets of atoms of the original Boolean algebras;
the free product of (atomic) epistemic algebras is the epistemic algebra whose set of atoms is
a set of copies of subsets of the Cartesian product of the sets of atoms of the original algebras,
where each subset contains at least one element corresponding to each of the atoms of the original
algebras and the copies exhaust the set of relations on such subsets such that any two atoms are
connected if and only if their components are connected as atoms of the original algebras. Several
of the operators used in this section are discussed in (Hill, 2006, Ch. 5) and Hill (forthcoming).
12A (epistemic) homomorphism between interpreted (epistemic) algebras is simply a pair of
(epistemic) homomorphisms, between the interpreting and base algebras respectively, commuting
accordingly. See also Deﬁnition 7. Note that the knowledge elements satisfy the conditions for
knowledge elements in Deﬁnitions 2 and 4: in particular, the clause for pointed epistemic algebras,
which effectively assures that the agent knows that he is ignorant as to the truth of newly available
sentences which are not already implied by his knowledge, guarantees negative introspection.
13Naturally, there is no equivalent of revision in awareness change, for there is no problem with
incoming information “contradicting” the current state of awareness.
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For interpreted epistemic algebras, the easiest way to deﬁne restriction is in
terms of the relational or Kripke structures associated with the algebras.14 B= =
(BI; B0;q0), where B0 is the modal algebra corresponding to the restriction, to the
:q() states, of the relational structure corresponding to the algebra B, and q0
is the modal homomorphism which agrees with q regarding the valuation of the
elements of I on the common states. This deﬁnition guarantees that there is an
embedding,  of the set of atoms of B0 into the set of atoms of B. The restriction of
the pointed epistemic algebra (B;) by , written as (B;)=, is (B=;0) where,
for any atom x 2 B0, x 6 q0(0) iff (x) 6  in B.
In the pointed algebra after restriction, there is new logical structure. This
operator does not alter the local language but only the structure on that language.
It thus does not alter awareness, but may lead to a change in the agent’s beliefs
(or knowledge): : may now be known for example.15 The structural change in
the algebra corresponds to the removal of all small worlds where : indeed, the
restriction operation on interpreted epistemic algebras is none other than the op-
eration involved in models of public announcement (see van Ditmarsch and Kooi
(2006), for example). For this reason, little speciﬁc attention shall be dedicated to
this operator in what follows.
Intuitively, these two operators seem to be able to capture the sorts of change
in awareness mentioned above. Before the capital of Chile came into play, it was
absent from the pointed algebra modelling your knowledge; afterwards, it was in
the algebra, but logically independent of the rest of the sentences there, which
presumably pertained to logic and logic papers. This is modelled simply by the
operation of expansion with the sentence stating that Santiago is the capital of
Chile. As for the case of the theorem, before becoming aware of it, it was not in
the pointed algebra modelling your state of knowledge; afterwards, not only did
it belong to the (new) pointed algebra, it entered into logical relations with other
elements of the algebra (given the theorem, an result you have already established
implies the one you want to prove). The change is modelled by the composition
of an expansion – adding the theorem to the pointed algebra – and a restriction –
ruling out those “small worlds” where the theorem and the earlier result hold but
the result which is to be proven does not.
The consideration of these cases suggests that the two operations are sufﬁcient
to model any shift in interpreted algebra which corresponds to becoming aware,
but does not alter the logical structure on the sentences in the initial algebra. Such
14This deﬁnition thus tacitly uses results showing the relationships between relational structures
and modal algebras (Blackburn et al., 2001, Ch 5): for the ﬁnite case, which is the main one
considered here, not only does each relational structure generate a modal algebra, but each (ﬁnite)
model algebra generates a corresponding relational structure.
15There is certainly change of belief or knowledge, but which change may be a subtle question
in the case of pointed epistemic algebras: see van Ditmarsch and Kooi (2006) for example.
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shifts can be characterised formally as cases where the initial algebra is embedded
in the ﬁnal one, where embedding is understood in the following sense.16
Deﬁnition 7. An embedding of B = (BI; B;q) into B0 = (BI0; B0;q0), with I  I0,
consists of a pair of injective (epistemic) homomorphisms i : BI ! BI0 and b :
B ! B0, the former generated by the inclusion of I in I0, such that q0i = bq.
This pair will be called . The embedding is said to be non-trivial if B , B0.
Furthermore, an embedding of (B;) into (B0;0) consists of an embedding of
the interpreted algebras , such that 0 = (), in the case of pointed algebras, or
0 = () ^
V
:K( _  ) for pointed epistemic algebras, where the conjunction
is taken over the   2 B, such that  ;B   and the non-trivial  2 B0 n B.
(Non-trivial) embeddings nicely capture the properties of becoming aware.
The fact that the new algebra is larger than the old one represents the agent as
becoming aware in the shift from the old to the new algebra; on the other hand,
the fact that the old algebra embeds into the new one, with no change in its logical
structure (the mapping is an embedding) captures the fact that in becoming aware
there is no change to that of which he was already aware. Finally, for a given
algebra and any given extension of the local language, there are several algebras
with that language in which the original algebra embeds: this captures the fact that
they are several ways of becoming aware of a given sentence (or set of sentences),
depending on the logical relationships with the elements of which the agent was
already aware.
The following proposition shows that the operations of expansion and restric-
tion are indeed sufﬁcient to model any such change.
Proposition 1. Let  be an embedding of B1 into B2 (both either interpreted or
interpreted epistemic algebras). Then there is a sequence of expansions followed
by restrictions such that B1 +1 ++n= 1=:::= k = B2. Similarly for pointed
(epistemic) algebras.17
This result shows that the factorisation of the process of becoming aware into
an expansion and a restriction is “complete”, in the sense that it can account for
any case of becoming aware.
Finally, for the purposes of the next section, the following deﬁnition will be
useful.
16Embeddings, thus deﬁned, not only preserve the structure of the algebras, but also the sen-
tences taken as primitive – thus the condition that I  I0. This seems natural, given that the cases
of interest are those where the agent’s awareness has increased, and the mere fact of becoming
aware does not seem to effect the logical structure nor the primitive sentences which one had pre-
viously. A slightly more complicated version of Proposition 1 still holds for a weakened notion of
embedding.
17Proofs are to be found in the appendix.
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Deﬁnition 8. An interpreted (resp. pointed, epistemic) algebra B2 (resp. (B2;2))
is said to be an extension of B1 (resp. (B1;1)) by 1;:::;n (n > 1) if and only
if there is a sentence   2 B2 n B1 such that B2 = B1 + 1 +  + n=  (resp.
(B2;2) = (B1;1) + 1 +  + n= )).
The extensions correspond to the range of different ways of becoming aware
of a sentence discussed above; as already noted, there are several extensions of
a given algebra by a given sentence. By Proposition 1, for any embedding, the
embedding algebra is an extension of the embedded algebra by the appropriate
set of sentences; the converse (every extension is an embedding) is evidently true.
Finally, since the expansion and restriction operations commute, any extension by
a set of sentences can be thought of as a sequence of extensions, each by a single
sentence.
Becoming unaware Not only can one become aware of a sentence, but a sen-
tence can also fall out of awareness. Although you were aware of the capital of
Chile when reading the second sentence of this article, you had perhaps forgot-
ten about it by the middle of the ﬁrst section. If awareness is the presence of a
sentence in the interpreted algebra, then becoming unaware involves the loss of
the sentence, and indeed the structure associated with it. The simple operation of
narrowing shall be used to model this.
Deﬁnition 9 (Narrowing). The narrowing of an interpreted (epistemic) algebra
(BI; B;q) by , written B , is deﬁned as follows: if  2 BI, B  = (BIn; B0;q0),
where  is the smallest I0  I such that  2 BI0, q0 is the restriction of q to BIn
and B0 is the image of BIn under q. If  < B, B    = B.
Thenarrowingofthepointed(epistemic)algebra(B;)by, writtenas(B;) 
, is (B   ; ), where   is the )B -minimal element such that  )B  .18
To a certain extent, this may be seen as an equivalent to belief revision’s con-
traction: whereas the latter corresponds to situations where one reneges on beliefs,
the former allows a modelling of cases when a sentence falls out of awareness.
When reading the second sentence of this paper, the sentence regarding the capi-
tal of Chile was in the interpreted algebra involved in the modelling of your state
of knowledge. Subsequently, this sentence fell out of that algebra. The result-
ing, smaller, algebra is the sub-algebra of remaining sentences: this is exactly the
result of narrowing the original algebra by the sentence in question.
On the other hand, there are important dissimilarities between the narrow-
ing operation and contraction, many of which are due to a difference in the two
18Notethatthisdeﬁnitioniscorrect, becausewearesupposingﬁnitealgebras(footnote1.1).This
supposition is stronger than required: algebras containing inﬁnima for any set of elements would
be sufﬁcient.
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phenomena. Whereas the contraction operation seeks to capture those situations
where one is forced to give up a belief, one will never ﬁnd oneself in a position
where one accepts to or decides to become unaware of a sentence. Becoming
unaware is a gradual, more ephemeral process, for which the question of time is
perhaps more crucial. For such reasons, the narrowing operation should not be
understood as the same sort of model as those proposed by current theories of
belief revision and communication. Whereas the latter models consider the effect
on an initial state of incoming information, taken to be delivered to the agent at
a given instant, narrowing captures a longer process, where the sentence falling
out of awareness does not represent an element delivered to (or extracted from)
the agent at any particular moment, but is rather part of the characterisation of
the change which the agent undergoes. For a more subtle model of changes in
awareness, which accounts for some of these issues, though is less amenable to
axiomatisation, see Hill (2006, §2.3).
This has consequences for the meaningful challenges which the phenomenon
of becoming unaware poses for the modeler and logician. Whereas, in the case of
contraction, a crucial question is that of choosing, for contraction by a disjunction,
which of the disjuncts to give up, the analogous question for narrowing – choos-
ing which clause to become unaware of when narrowing by a complex sentence
– is effectively meaningless, since such a choice never presents itself. Indeed,
generally, cases of becoming unaware involve becoming unaware of sentences –
not only a certain number of “basis sentences” but also logical combinations of
them (for example, conjunctions with sentence of which the agent stays aware).
In terms of the proposed model, where the agent’s language (interpreting algebra)
is a set of sentences generated by a set of (locally) primitive sentences I, cases
of becoming unaware involve sentences falling out of the generating set I (with
the ensuing repercussions for awareness of compound sentences). Therefore, it
is essentially narrowings by sentences in I which are the important cases for un-
derstanding awareness change. Indeed, the above deﬁnition, applied to a single
element of I, behaves as one would expect: the resulting algebra is the subalgebra
generated by the other elements of I. For the sake of completeness, the deﬁnition
has been extended to other elements of the algebra by supposing that they charac-
terise a change in which the agent becomes unaware of all the primitive sentences
they (essentially) contain.
2 The logic
Models have been proposed and motivated for awareness and change of aware-
ness. In this section, the question of the logic of awareness and awareness change
shall be treated.
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Consider, for the sake of analogy, the logics proposed for changes of be-
lief: notably, the logics of belief revision. There are (at least) two paradigms,
each with its own idea of what counts as a “logic” of belief change. The classic
AGM paradigm considers a logic to be a collection of rules on how beliefs should
change. The project is to propose (formal) models of belief states and operations
on these models such that these operations comply to the rules for change and
exhaust the set of possible ways in which one can comply with these rules (see
Gärdenfors (1988); Gärdenfors and Rott (1995); Hansson (1999)). It is notewor-
thy that in this paradigm, the logical structures involved – notably the models of
agents’ belief states – are generally propositional; talk of belief and belief change
is only in the metalanguage. On the other hand, the Dynamic Epistemic Logic
(DEL) paradigm adopts a richer (object) language, containing not only operators
for belief but also operators describing the changes which may occur (generally in
the form of incoming information). It imposes axioms and rules on this language,
thus forming a logic, and searches for classes of structures which interpret the
language and are sound and complete with respect to the logic (see van Benthem
(2007); van Ditmarsch (2005)). Note that soundness and completeness is desired
not only with respect to the dynamic fragment of the logic (describing change in
belief) but also with respect to the static part (describing the beliefs at a given
moment).
In Section 2.1, postulates for awareness change, in the AGM-style, shall be
proposed. Atthisstage, thelogicof(static)awarenessneednotbediscussed, since
the theorist’s language – the only language where one can talk non-trivially about
the agent’s current state of awareness (see Section 1.1) – is not formalised in this
paradigm, but left as the meta-language. In Sections 2.2 and 2.3, the DEL-styled
approach is adopted: in this case, for the logic to be non-trivial, it is the theorist’s
language which must be taken as the object language (and thus formalised). This
is what is done: in Section 2.2, logics of (static) awareness are given, and a sound
and complete semantics is proposed in terms of pointed (epistemic) algebras; in
Section 2.3, the logics and the semantics are extended to the dynamic case, to
obtain sound and complete logics for awareness change.
2.1 Logic of awareness change, AGM style
The aim of this section is to propose AGM-style postulates for awareness change.
Recall that there are two basis sorts of change: becoming aware and becoming
unaware. Furthermore, there are many ways of becoming aware of a given sen-
tence; using the terminology of Deﬁnition 8, there are several extensions of the
current state of awareness (modelled by the appropriate algebra) by a given sen-
tence (of which the agent is not already aware). However, as shown in Propo-
sition 1, any change which results in an increase in awareness can be factorised
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into expansions – the “free” addition of sentences to the interpreted algebra –
and restrictions – which alter the logical structure of the algebra without touch-
ing the local language. To the extent that restrictions are operations which end
up altering the agent’s knowledge without changing his awareness, they are akin
to well-understood operators of knowledge or belief change, for which postulates
have already been proposed and discussed. For this reason, restriction shall not be
considered in this section nor in subsequent sections. Indeed, a set of postulates
will be proposed which characterise the operation of expansion: that is, expan-
sion satisﬁes the postulates and the only operation satisfying the postulates is the
expansion operation (this sort of result is analogous to the AGM representation
theorems for belief change). Naturally, not all cases of becoming aware will sat-
isfy all of these axioms, because not all cases of becoming aware consist only of
expansions; many are followed by restrictions. However, it will be easy to see
what distinguishes expansions from other extensions: indeed, it will be shown
that the set of extensions is characterised completely by a well-deﬁned and intu-
itive subset of the postulates characterising expansion. Finally, postulates will be
presented for narrowing and a representation theorem proved.
Becoming aware For B an interpreted (epistemic) algebra and  a sentence, we
have the following postulates.
(E 1) B +  is an interpreted (epistemic) algebra
(E 2)  2 B +  (Success)
(E 3) if  2 B, B = B +  (Vacuity)
(E 4) for a sentence  ,   < BI[fg, then   < B +  (Minimality)
(E 5) there is an embedding from B into B +  (Inclusion)
(E 6) if  < B, then there is no   2 B such that   ,B+  (Freeness)19
(E 6’) if < B, thenforall  2 B, K( ^)andarenon-trivially)B+-equivalent
iff  = K( 0^) with  0 2 B,   ,B  0; similarly for : (Modal Freeness)20
Freeness and modal freeness are the axioms particular to expansion: freeness
guarantees, inthecaseofordinaryinterpretedalgebras, thattheextensioninvolved
is simply an expansion, with no subsequent restriction being applied, whereas
19Here   denotes the element of B and its image in B + ; see Deﬁnition 5.
20Non-trivial equivalence occurs between two different but )-equivalent elements: ie. they
have different elements of the interpreting algebra, but the same element of the base algebra.
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modal freeness, which is required in addition in the case of epistemic algebras, is
required for the same purpose (to guarantee there are no restrictions which only
effect the knowledge operator).
For the case of pointed (epistemic) algebras, postulates are needed regard-
ing the element modelling knowledge. Consider the following postulates, where
(B;) is a pointed (epistemic) algebra,  is a sentence, the interpreted (epistemic)
algebra of (B;) +  is B0 and the knowledge element is 0.
(E 7) For all   2 B, 0 )B0   iff  )B   (Conservativity)
(E 8) For all   2 B0 n B, 0 )B0   iff   ,B0 > (Ignorance)
(E 8’) For all   2 B such that K( _  ) <B0 > and K( _  ) <B0 ?, if  ;B  
then 0 )B0 :K( _  ) and 0 )B0 :K(: _  ) (Ignorance)
(E 7) guarantees that just by becoming aware the agent does not gain any
knowledge regarding that of which he was already aware. Note that, in the case
of pointed algebras, (E 8’) is vacuous, since there are no modal operators in the
algebra; however, it is required in the case of pointed epistemic algebras to guar-
antee that the knowledge set satisﬁes negative introspection.21 On the other hand,
(E 8) is too strong in the case of pointed epistemic algebras, because it demands
that the agent gains no knowledge, not even regarding his own ignorance, and this
conﬂicts with negative introspection. It is needed in the case of pointed algebras,
however, to assure that nothing is learnt in the change.
Remark. There is a simple and evident analogy between the ﬁrst ﬁve postulates
and Gärdenfors postulates (K+1) (K+4); (K+6) for belief expansion (Gärdenfors,
1988, §3.2). The following important difference should nevertheless be empha-
sized: whilst the AGM framework uses a propositional language, these postulates
and the result below also hold for the case where the agent has a knowledge (and
awareness) operator in his language – that is, for interpreted epistemic algebras.
Philosophicallyspeaking, theanalogyextendsintothejustiﬁcationforthepos-
tulates: in the belief case each of these postulates have their intuition, though each
is debatable, and it seems as if the situation may be similar in the awareness case.
Take for example the postulate of inclusion: (in the awareness case) it says that
becoming aware of something should not affect the logical relationships one ac-
cepts between the sentences of which one was already aware. Although there
is a strong intuition about the correctness of this postulate – one often does not
and generally should not change one’s opinions about the logical relationships be-
tween sentences just because something else has come into play – and although
21Note that the restriction K( _  ) <B0 >, K( _  ) <B0 ? in (E 8’) is empty in the case of
expansion though not necessarily for extension in general.
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this intuition is certainly pertinent in many cases (for example, becoming aware
of the capital of Chile whilst reading a paper on awareness), one might argue that
there are cases where it is justiﬁably violated. These will generally be cases where
becoming aware of something makes one realise an error or false presupposition
under which one was harbouring. The analysis of these cases are however com-
plex, for it is not clear whether they are to be understood as cases where it is the
fact of becoming aware which leads to a change in the initial logical structure, or
whether there is a change of awareness of the sort considered here which is then
followed by some sort of belief revision operation, under which the logical struc-
ture used changes. Evidently, a combined theory of belief and awareness change
is required to clarify the weight of this objection against inclusion, and such a
project lies beyond the scope of this paper. We will thus satisfy ourselves with
the immediate intuitive appeal of the postulates (it will be shown below that any
lack of intuitiveness in the freeness postulates have to do with the fact that they
characterise expansion as opposed to any other extension).
For the operation of expansion, there is the following representation theorem.
Theorem 1 (Representation / characterisation theorem). The operation of expan-
sion of interpreted algebras (respectively interpreted epistemic algebras) satisﬁes
(E 1 – 6) (resp. (E 1 – 6’)). The operation of expansion of pointed algebras (resp.
pointed epistemic algebras) satisﬁes (E 1 – 6), (E 7), (E 8) (resp. (E 1 – 6’), (E 7),
(E 8’)).
Furthermore, letbeanyfunctiontakingpairsofinterpreted(epistemic)alge-
bras and sentences to interpreted (epistemic) algebras, satisfying (E 1 – 6) (resp.
(E 1 – 6’)). Then, for all B and , B   = B+. Similarly for pointed (epistemic)
algebras and (E 1 – 6), (E 7), (E 8) (resp. (E 1 – 6’), (E 7), (E 8’)).
It was claimed above that the freeness postulates are required to characterise
expansion rather than any other extension. This can be shown rigourously by the
following representation theorem for extensions.
Theorem 2 (Representation / characterisation theorem). Extensions of interpreted
algebras and of interpreted epistemic algebras satisfy (E 1 – 5). Extensions of
pointed algebras (resp. pointed epistemic algebras) satisfy (E 1 – 5), (E 7), (E 8)
(resp. (E 1 – 5), (E 7), (E 8’)).
Furthermore, let  be any relation between pairs of interpreted (epistemic)
algebras and sentences and interpreted (epistemic) algebras, satisfying (E 1 – 5).
Then, for all B and , B   is an extension of B. Similarly for pointed (epistemic)
algebras and (E 1 – 5), (E 7), (E 8) (resp. (E 1 – 5), (E 7), (E 8’)).
As noted above, there are several possible extensions of a given algebra by a
given sentence; this result is thus not so much a characterisation of an operation
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of extension as a characterisation of the relation, between pairs of algebras and
sentences, of ...being an extension of ...by .... It is a comforting fact for the
correctness of the model proposed that its characterising properties are all rather
intuitive, if not beyond debate.
Becoming unaware For B an interpreted (epistemic) algebra and  a sentence,
(N 1) B    is an interpreted (epistemic) algebra
(N 2) if   2 B, then   < B    (Success)22
(N 3) if  < B, B = B    (Vacuity)
(N 4) for   a sentence,   2 BIn, then   2 B    (Minimality)
(N 5) there is an embedding from B    into B (Inclusion)
Once again, for (B;) a pointed (epistemic) algebra and  a sentence, the
interpreted (epistemic) algebra, call it B0, of (B;)    satisﬁes all the postulates
above, and the knowledge element, call it 0 satisﬁes
(N 6) For all   2 B0, 0 )B0   iff  )B   (Conservativity)
Remark. There is an analogy between the (N 1) – (N 3) and (N 5) and the postu-
lates(K 1) (K 4)forbeliefcontraction(Gärdenfors(1988, §3.4)andAlchourron
et al. (1985)). Belief contraction’s recovery axiom (K 5), though loosely related
to the minimality axiom (N 4), does not have a strict analogue here, because the
expansion and narrowing operations are not exactly “inverses” as in the case of
belief change: although the result of narrowing and then expanding by the same
sentence will be an interpreting algebra with the same language, it may not have
the same logical structure.23 Moreover, (N 2) has the form it does because of the
interpretation of narrowing by a complex sentence, according to which the agent
becomes unaware of all the primitive sentences contained in it: see the discussion
following Deﬁnition 9. It was noted that the important case is that of narrowing
by an element of I. In such cases, (N 2) reduces to the statement one naturally
expects:  < B   .
On the philosophical side, similar comments to those made above about be-
coming aware can be made regarding the intuition of these postulates, with one
22 is as stated in Deﬁnition 9.
23However, using the notion of extension (Deﬁnition 8, it is possible to replace the mini-
mality axiom with something closer to the recovery axiom of belief contraction, namely: for
 = f1;:::;ng deﬁned as in Deﬁnition 9, B is an extension of B    by 1;:::;n.
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exception: the absence of natural instantaneous cases of becoming unaware (see
Section 1.2). The discussion up to this point has been neutral on the question of
whether postulates and logics of change are to be understood normatively – as
standards for “rational” change of epistemic state – or descriptively – as a collec-
tion of properties of our actual changes of epistemic state. It is not the ambition
of this paper to embark upon a discussion of this question, and so the comments
made above regarding the postulates for becoming aware were formulated so as to
apply to both readings. For the case of unawareness, although this neutrality is not
impossible to conserve, it is threatened, basically because of the position which
states that one can never justiﬁably become unaware of something. According
to this position, it is never rational to become unaware, so there are no rational
principles on an operation which makes one unaware (on the other hand, recall
from Section 1.2 that the operation can be thought of as describing a change in
awareness, so properties of the operation correspond to properties of this change).
However, this position may be contestable, on the same sort of grounds used to
defend “bounded rationality” behaviour as at least partly rational; namely, the idea
that, given the limits on human cognitive capacity (in this case, the limited number
of things of which he can be aware at any moment) certain otherwise “irrational”
principles are justiﬁed (in this case, letting things fall out of awareness). An ex-
tended discussion of such issues is beyond the scope of this paper; as in the case
of becoming aware, we will satisfy ourselves with the immediate intuitive appeal
of the postulates.
Theorem 3 (Representation / characterisation theorem). The operation of nar-
rowing of interpreted (epistemic) algebras (Deﬁnition 9) satisﬁes (N 1 - 5). The
operation of narrowing of pointed (epistemic) algebras satisﬁes (N 1 - 6).
Furthermore, let  be any function taking pairs of interpreted (epistemic) al-
gebras and sentences to interpreted (epistemic) algebras, satisfying (N 1 – 5).
Then, for all B and , B   = B   . Similarly for pointed (epistemic) algebras
and (N 1 - 6).
2.2 Logic of awareness, Epistemic Logic style
The DEL approach to the likes of belief change begins with a static logic – of
belief, orknowledge–andthenaddsdynamicelements. Inthissection, the(static)
logic of awareness and knowledge shall be considered, as a preliminary to using
it in the dynamic logic presented in the Section 2.3.
A logic of awareness and knowledge requires a language, hence the immediate
question: whose? The logic of the agent’s language, even when the appropriate
operators are present, is particularly poor: the awareness operator is trivial, for
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example (§1.1).24 The theorist’s language is more interesting, and that which will
be dealt with here; it thus needs to be formalised.
Letthetheorist’slanguagebeLKA
P , thelanguagegeneratedfromasetofpropo-
sitional letters P by closure under Boolean connectives and two operators K (ex-
plicit knowledge) and A (awareness). Pointed (epistemic) algebras are models
of the agent’s states of knowledge (in the scientiﬁc sense of a representation of
the target phenomenon); the theorist’s language is designed to talk about such
states; thus one would expect that the language LKA
P can be interpreted in pointed
(epistemic) algebras. Indeed, it will turn out that pointed (epistemic) algebras are
models of the theorist’s logic (in the logical sense of a structure where theorems
of the logic are satisﬁed). Sentences of LKA
P can be evaluated on the pointed (epis-
temic) algebra (B;), whose interpreting algebra is generated by a subset of P, in
the following way:
(B;)  A iff  2 B
(B;)  K iff  )B 
(B;)  : iff (B;) 2 
(B;)   ^   iff (B;)   and (B;)   
This does not specify the valuation of all sentences in LKA
P : it does not allow
valuations of sentences regarding non-epistemic states of affairs. This is natural:
pointed (epistemic) algebras are after all models from the agent’s point of view,
and the “real” state of affairs is external to this point of view, and known only
(by supposition) to the theorist. To capture the “real” state of affairs, and to allow
valuations of other sentences, exogenous structure needs to be added, namely a
maximally consistent set of propositions of the propositional language LP gener-
ated by P; call it . Such a structure determines the valuation of sentences which
do not necessarily appear in the interpreted algebra, and so of which the agent is
not aware, as well as those of which he is aware. The only condition placed on
 will guarantee that what is being modelled is knowledge: in the modal logic
literature at least, knowledge is distinguished from belief by the fact that what
agent purports to know is in fact true. This is represented by the requirement that
0 )B , where 0 is the projection of  into the algebra B.
Let B (resp. Be) be the class of pairs ((B;);), each consisting, on the one
hand, of a pointed algebra (resp. pointed epistemic algebra) (B;) whose inter-
preting (epistemic) algebra is generated by a subset of P, and, on the other hand,
a maximally consistent set  of sentences of LP. Valuations of sentences in LKA
P
24Evidently, consideration of operators in the agent’s language describing the awareness of
others is of interest: treatment of such cases may be carried out along the lines of the case of the
theorist.
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are provided by extending the previous clauses to elements of B (resp. Be) in the
obvious way, and by adding the following clause:
((B;);)   iff  2 
The clauses given above provide a valuation of the language LKA
P over Be (the
pointed epistemic algebras), but not over B (the pointed algebras). There is no
way to evaluate sentences with embedded operators – sentences pertaining to the
agent’s knowledge about his knowledge, or his knowledge about his awareness
and so on. This is simply because pointed algebras model the agent as not pos-
sessing the knowledge and awareness operators in his language, and so not being
able to formulate sentences involving them, about which he could have (ﬁrst-
order) knowledge or awareness. Although there is insufﬁcient space to discuss
the issue at length, it should be noted that this consequence of the model is not
without its intuition: although one can, via theories of behaviour, give an account
of knowledge such that an observer can attribute knowledge to an agent who does
not possess the concept of knowledge, it is much more difﬁcult to give an account
such that the observer can attribute second-order knowledge (knowledge about
the agent’s own knowledge) to an agent devoid of the concept.25 Technically, for
pointed algebras, it sufﬁces to limit oneself to the sub-language of LKA
P consisting
of formulas of modal depth at most one (ie. no embedding of operators), call it
LKA
P : the above clauses provide a valuation of LKA
P over B.
The appropriate soundness and completeness results are as follows (the rules
and axioms are given in Figure 1).
Theorem 4. The system Awp = fProp; MP;Gen;K;T;A0;A1;A2g is a sound and
complete axiomatisation with respect to B.
The system Awr = fProp; MP;Gen;K;T;4;5;A0   A5g is a sound and com-
plete axiomatisation with respect to Be.
Note that Awp is the restriction of Awr to the language LKA
P ; such a restriction
was motivated above.
Furthermore, it is worth remarking that the system Awr is similar to the axiom
system proposed by Halpern (2001). That system is complete over several impor-
tant semantics for awareness that have been recently proposed, notably Halpern’s
propositionally determined awareness structures (Halpern, 2001) and the gener-
alised standard models of Modica and Rustichini (Modica and Rustichini, 1999);
to this extent, the logic can be thought of as the “standard” logic of awareness in
the literature. The only difference between the logic presented above and that of
25Indeed, one only gets a valuation on pointed epistemic algebras by confounding the knowl-
edge operator in the theorist’s language with the knowledge operator in the agent’s language.
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Figure 1: Static axioms and rules
Prop Axioms of propositional logic
MP Modus ponens
Gen From  infer A ! K
K K ^ K( !  ) ! K 
T K ! ;
4 K ! KK;
5 :K ^ A:K ! K:K
A0 K ! A
A1 A( ^) $ A^A 
A2 A $ A:
A3 AK $ A
A4 A $ AA
A5 A ! KA
Halpern is Halpern’s irrelevance rule (Irr). This rule is not required here, whereas
the completeness proofs that Halpern has proposed rely on it. Nevertheless, he ex-
presses doubts about the necessity of this rule to his results; if he is correct that the
rule (Irr) is superﬂuous, then the model proposed here and the models of Halpern
and Modica and Ristichini are essentially equivalent.
Remark. AnoteworthypropertyofTheorem4isthedependanceonthestipulation
that the interpreting algebras of the pointed algebras in B and Be are generated by
subsets of P, the set of primitive sentences of LKA
P . In a word, this condition
demands that the agent’s language always agrees with the theorist’s regarding the
sentences taken as primitive; it follows that the consequence relation he is using
can always be taken to agree with the theorist’s. If this condition is dropped,
the agent’s local consequence relation, under which his knowledge set is closed,
may not agree with the theorist’s, so his state of knowledge may cease to satisfy
some of the axioms, since they are expressed in the theorist’s language. The
rule of generalisation and the axiom K, for example, may suffer. If the agent
takes the sentences  and  !   to be primitive, then it need not be the case
that  ^ ( !  ) )   in his interpreted algebra (even if   does belong to this
algebra); in such algebras, there are knowledge elements according to which he
knows  and  !   but not  , or, to put it another way, in which he does not
know (^( !  )) !  , although he is aware of it; so generalisation and K fail.
See Hill (forthcoming) for a fuller discussion of this point, and its relation to the
problem of logical omniscience.
It is doubtless possible to weaken this condition, and the logic, by adding spe-
ciﬁc “syntactic” requirements on the forms of sentences in the interpreted (epis-
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temic) algebras. However, it is perhaps more interesting to consider the general
question posed by such a situation, a question which concerns the relationship
between giving a logic for a phenomenon (such as knowledge or awareness) and
(formally) modelling the phenomenon. The problem of primitive sentences con-
cerns the relationship between the theorist’s and the agent’s languages, and thus
only arises when one tries to develop a logic of (the agent’s) awareness which (for
fear of triviality) needs to be expressed in the theorist’s language. This is not to
say that such a project should not be pursued – quite the contrary, logics of aware-
ness are important – but rather that when it comes to modelling awareness, where
the aim is to capture as accurately as possible the agent’s state of knowledge and
awareness, use of the theorist’s language should perhaps be avoided. This seems
to argue in favour of a sharp distinction between models of awareness and logics
of awareness, and for the development of models which rely as little as possible
on the theorist’s language; in other words, it argues in favour of the strategy of the
present paper, and the model proposed in Section 1.
2.3 Logic of awareness change, DEL style
Dynamic Epistemic Logic extends ordinary Epistemic Logic by adding operators
for change; see van Benthem (2007); van Ditmarsch (2005), for example, for
recent applications to belief revision. The ﬁnal task in this paper is to do the same
for awareness: extend the logic of knowledge and awareness presented in the
previous section by adding operators describing changes in awareness. A logic
shall be ﬁrst be proposed for expansion and narrowing; as in §2.1, to bring out
the difference between expansion and extensions in general, a (weaker) logic,
for extensions and narrowing, shall then be presented. Furthermore, given that
DEL approaches normally use the whole epistemic language, rather than just the
fragment of modal depth one, only the case of interpreted epistemic algebras shall
be discussed.26
The appropriate theorist’s language will be an extension of the language LKA
P
containing operators for talking about becoming aware of  and becoming un-
aware of . However, as for the case of pointed algebras in Section 2.2, the
agent’s expressive capacities places restrictions on the things which the theorist
can meaningfully say about his changes of awareness. Most notably, the agent’s
languages do not contain operators for talking about change of awareness. Al-
though this restriction may be unnecessary for the case of becoming unaware –
after all, one can consider what one would think had one not been aware of cer-
26Dynamic logics of awareness which are sound and complete over B can be given for a lan-
guage extending LKA
P , in generally the same manner as that described here, with a few added
complications.
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tain issues – it is certainly natural for the case of becoming aware – to consider
what one would think had one been aware of a particular issue, one must already
be aware of it. Given this assumption above the agent’s languages, it makes no
sense for the theorist to consider sentences such as “after becoming aware of ‘after
becoming aware of ,  ’, ” or “the agent knows that, after becoming aware of ,
 ”. For this reason, the language used will not contain (1) sentences where there
is an operator [+] or [ ] with  having a subformula [+ ] 0 or [  ] 0; and (2)
sentences where there is an operator [+] or [ ] in the scope of an operator K or
A. Let LKA+ 
P be the extension of the language LKA
P by operators [+], [ ] for all
 2 LKA
P which contains only sentences where these operators are not in the scope
of operators K and A.
Fortheremainderofthissection, foranysentence 2 LKA
P , let = fp1;:::; png
be the set of elements of P featuring in . For the logic of expansion and narrow-
ing, the valuation of the LKA+ 
P is deﬁned by adding the following clauses to those
presented in the previous section.
((B;);)  [+]  iff ((B;);) + p1 +  + pn   
((B;);)  [ ]  iff ((B;);)   p1      pn   
where the deﬁnition of expansion (resp. narrowing) is extended to pairs con-
sisting of pointed epistemic algebras and maximally consistent sets of sentences
of LP by stating that it does not alter the set of sentences .
Remark. As opposed to the AGM-style case (especially for the case of expan-
sion),27 all changes of awareness expressed with the operators [+] and [ ] have
to be considered to boil down to changes in awareness of the primitive sentences
P. This is related to the restrictions on interpreted algebras placed in the static
logic and discussed at the end of section §2.2: if changes of awareness were not
translatable in terms of changes of awareness of elements of P, then it would
be possible to attain, by applying change operations, interpreted algebras whose
interpreting algebras were not generated by elements of P, and the static logic
proposed in the previous section (which, as noted, is more or less standard in the
domain) would no longer be valid. This does have the (perhaps unwelcome) con-
sequence that expansion by  ^   and expansion by  !   have the same result,
though it could be argued to be a consequence of the discrepancy between a logic
and a model mentioned above, rather than a fault of this logic in particular.
The axioms for dynamic operators are given in Figure 2 (note that, in + K, J
27The valuation and the axioms for narrowing take the form they do largely due to the inter-
pretation of narrowing by a complex sentence discussed after Deﬁnition 9. Note however that
(B;)   p1      pn does not necessarily coincide with (B;)    for all : p _ :p _ q is a case
in point (both p and q are absent from B   p   q but p is not necessarily absent from B   ).
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Figure 2: Dynamic axioms and rules
+ prop for p 2 P, [+]p $ p
+ ^ [+](  ^ ) $ [+]  ^ [+]
+ : [+]:  $ :[+] 
+ A [+]A





pj; pk distinct elements of ,
A ^
V
l2J[K :Apl ! ([+]K( _
) $ K )
– prop for p 2 P, [ ]p $ p
– ^ [ ](  ^ ) $ [ ]  ^ [ ]
– : [ ]:  $ :[ ] 
– A for p 2 , [ ]:Ap
– K [ ]K  $ K  ^ [ ]A 
and K may be empty, and   may simply be ?). Let Awrd be the result of extending
Awr by these axioms. We have the following theorem.
Theorem 5. The system Awrd is sound and complete with respect to Be.
As in the AGM case (Section 2.1), a speciﬁc axiom is required to guarantee
that the operator involved in becoming aware is expansion rather than any other
extension. This axiom is + K, which states, more or less, that as little is learnt
as possible on becoming aware. Once again, as in the AGM case, the axiom
systemcanbeweakenedtoasystemwhichissoundandcomplete, butwithrespect
to extensions in general (Deﬁnition 8) rather than expansions in particular. Let
Awrdext be the system Awrd with + K replaced by the weaker axiom
+extK K  ! [+]K 
Consider a function fext which associates to every pointed epistemic algebra
(B;) and every sentence  an extension of (B;) by the primitive sentences
p1;:::; pn 2  (Deﬁnition 8). fext speciﬁes one among the many extensions of
(B;) which contain  and still respect the theorist’s language. Satisfaction of
LKA+ 
P will be deﬁned relative to a pointed epistemic algebra and a function fext:
all the satisfaction clauses given above are essentially unchanged, except the sat-
isfaction clause for [+], which becomes
((B;);); fext  [+]  iff (fext((B;););)   
This says that the   will be true when the agent becomes aware of  if and only
ifitistrueinthepointedepistemicalgebrawhich fext singlesoutastheappropriate
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extensionoftheoriginalalgebratocontain. LetBe
ext bethesetofpairsofpointed
epistemic algebras in Be and functions fext of the sort described above. Note that
this setup and this satisfaction clause are a generalisation of the case of expansion
presented above: this satisfaction clause reduces to the previous one on elements
((B;);); fext where fext is an expansion; furthermore, the axiom + K, although
not valid on Be
ext, characterises the subset of elements where fext is an expansion.
The generalisation supports the following soundness and completeness result.
Theorem 6. The system Awrdext is sound and complete with respect to Be
ext.
As in Section 2.1, this result brings out the difference between expansion and
extensions in general. The strong + K axiom characterises expansions, but does
not apply to all extensions. Indeed, the much weaker axiom +ext K characterises
all extensions, to the extent that, if it is satisﬁed in a pointed epistemic algebra
((B;), then for any , there exists an extension by the primitive sentences in 
suchthatthe“becomingaware”operatorisfaithfullyinterpretedbythisextension;
the fext singles out the appropriate extension in such cases.
Awareness is an important phenomenon for human knowledge and action.
Moreover, it poses some interesting logical and philosophical questions. This
paper offers a preliminary grip on the notion of awareness, and the important is-
sue of awareness change; in the process some of the deeper questions have been
touched upon. The central aims were to propose a model of awareness and aware-
ness change that supports a rigourous understanding of the phenomenon and to
use this model to develop logics both of awareness and awareness change. The
ﬁrst goal as accomplished in Section 1, with the introduction of the notion of in-
terpreted algebra – a representation of the logical structure the agent is using at a
given moment – which allowed a representation of the agent’s epistemic state as
understood from the agent’s point of view, as well as a representation of changes
of awareness in terms of operations on interpreted algebras. The second goal
was accomplished in Section 2, where logics of awareness and awareness change
were developed, both in the AGM-style and the DEL-style. Although more work
remains to be done – notably, the results need to be extended to the multi-agent
case – this paper offers a sold base for future development.
Appendix: proofs
Several of the proofs given here will rely on the assumption that the algebras are
ﬁnite; as noted in Section 1.1, this assumption is well motivated in discussions
of awareness, notably by the ﬁniteness of human agents at particular moments.
Moreover, recall from Deﬁnition 5 that, in the case of mappings between algebras,
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the same symbol shall be used both for an element of original algebra and its
image under the mapping.
Proof of Proposition 1. Let 1;:::;n be the sequence of elements in I2 n I1, and
consider B+ = B1 + 1 +  + n. (Since + is commutative, the order of the
elements is of no importance.) It follows immediately from Deﬁnitions 5 and 7
that the interpreting algebras of B+ and B2 – BI+ and BI2 – are isomorphic.
The isomorphism between BI+ and BI2 and the homomorphism B from B1 to
B2 generate a homomorphism + from B+ to B2 which is injective on B1  B+. Let
y be the maximal element of  1
+ (?) and pick   2 B+ with q+( ) = y. By construc-
tion, B+=  is isomorphic to B2 (as well as their interpreting algebras, their base
algebras are isomorphic). (Note that, since + is an epistemic homomorphism,
the set fx 2 B+j y 6 xg is a modal ﬁlter, so there are none of the well-known
complications discussed in van Ditmarsch and Kooi (2006).) It is straightforward
to check that the case of pointed (epistemic) goes through.28 
Proof of Theorems 1 and 2. It is straightforward to check that the operation of ex-
pansion satisﬁes the postulates.
Consider the other direction. Let  be an operation on interpreted (epistemic)
algebras satisfying (E 1 – 6) (resp. (E 1 – 6’)) and consider an arbitrary algebra B
and an arbitrary sentence . Let B0 = B  . If  2 B, by (E 3) B0 = B = B + .
Consider now the case where  < B. By (E 5), I  I0, and by (E 2),  2 BI0,
so BI[fg is a subalgebra of BI0. However, by (E 4), BI0 is a subalgebra of BI[fg;
so BI0 = BI[fg. By (E 5) again, there is an embedding B of B into B0. Given
Proposition 1 and Deﬁnition 8, this proves the interpreted algebra part of Theorem
2: B0 is an extension of B by . For Theorem 1, by (E 6), there are no non-trivial
relations between  and the elements of B (this is guaranteed by (E 6) and (E 6’)
in the epistemic case); thus, there is an embedding from the free product B 
 Bfxg
into B0, which acts like B on B and takes x to q0(). Since q0 is surjective,
B0 = B 
 Bfxg. By the commutation properties of the embedding, B0 = B + ; the
embedding in (E 5) is the canonical homomorphism between B and B + .
Consider ﬁnally an operation  on pointed (epistemic) algebras which satisﬁes
the appropriate postulates. By the reasoning above, the interpreting (epistemic)
algebra of (B;)   is B + , for all (B;) and . Let 0 be the knowledge
element of (B;)  . In the case of pointed algebras, by (E 7) and (E 8), 0 is the
smallest element of B+ which is below , and this is none other than  itself; so
(B;)   = (B;) + . In the case of pointed epistemic algebras, (E 7) implies
that 0 )B+ , and (E 8’) implies that, for each   2 B such that K(_ ) <B0 >,
K(_ ) <B0 ? and  ;B  , 0 )B+ :K( _) and 0 )B+ :K( _:). Since
28This proof assumes that the algebras are ﬁnite; however, an inﬁnite version may be obtained
by restricting by the set  1
+ (?) rather than assuming a maximal element.
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0 )B K0, by Deﬁnition 4, it follows that 0 is neither below  _ not  _: for
such  . These properties determine the value of 0 in B + : it is the conjunction
of  with all :K(  _ ) and :K(  _ :) for K( _  ) <B0 >, K( _  ) <B0 ?
and  ;B  ; so (B;)   = (B;) + . 
Proof of Theorem 3. It is straightforward to check that the operation of narrowing
satisﬁes the postulates.
Consider the other direction. Let  be an operation on interpreted (epistemic)
algebras satisfying (N 1 - 5) and consider an arbitrary algebra B and an arbitrary
sentence . Let B0 = B  . If  < B, by (N 3) B0 = B = B   . Consider now
the case where  2 B. By (N 5), I0  I, by (N 2), for all   2 ,   < BI0, so BI0 is a
subalgebra of BIn, where  is as stated in Deﬁnition 9. However, by (N 4), BIn
is a subalgebra of BI0; so BI0 = BIn. By (N 5), and by the commutation properties
of embeddings, B0 is isomorphic to the image of BIn in B under q and q0 is the
restriction of q to BIn. Hence B0 = B   .
Consider ﬁnally an operation  on pointed (epistemic) algebras which satis-
ﬁes, in addition to the other postulates, (N 6). By the reasoning above, the inter-
preting algebra of (B;)   is B , for all (B;) and . By (N 6), the knowledge
element of (B;)   is the inﬁmum, in B   , of f  2 B0 j  )B  g; this is just
the minimal element  0 of B  such that  )B  0. Thus (B;)   = (B;) .

Proof of Theorem 4. Soundness, in both cases, is straightforward.
For the completeness of Awp, consider a Awp-consistent set of sentences of
LKA
P , . Using traditional methods (“Lindenbaum’s Lemma”), extend it to a max-
imal consistent set (of sentences of LKA
P ), m. Take  to be the set of propositional
elements of m; since the latter is maximally consistent, the former is as well. Let
I = fp 2 P j Ap 2 mg, and B = (BI; B;q), where B and BI are Boolean algebras,
B is isomorphic to BI and q is the isomorphism. By axioms A1 and A2, for any
 2 LP, A 2 m iff  2 B. Furthermore, A0 guarantees that the elements of
f  j K  2 mg are all elements of B; K guarantees that this set is closed under
logical consequence both of LKA
P and of B (by construction, the two logical con-
sequences coincide, on the propositional language). Take  to be the inﬁmum of
this set; it is thus an element of B,29 and indeed a non-? element, since m is con-
sistent. T guarantees that 0 )B , for 0 the projection of  into B. ((B;);)
satisﬁes m, and thus .
For the completeness of Awr, proceed in a similar way. Take a Awr-consistent
set of sentences of LKA
P , , and a maximal consistent set extending it, m. Take
29 evidently exists and is an element of B in the ﬁnite case, which as noted previously, is the
pertinent one here.  will actually exist even if the algebras are inﬁnite, since B is freely generated.
Similar points apply to the case of epistemic algebras considered below.
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 and I as above, and B = (BI; B;q), where B and BI are isomorphic epistemic
algebras. In this case, A1-A4 guarantee that, for any  2 LKA
P , A 2 m iff  2 B;
A5 guarantees that one can take A ,B > for all  2 B. As above, take  to be the
inﬁmum of f  j K  2 mg; A0 guarantees that this is an element of B, 4 guarantees
that  ) K, 5 guarantees that if  ;  , then  ) :K , and the consistency
of m combined with the coincidence between the consequence relations in B and
LKA
P guarantee that it is not equivalent to ?. T assures the condition on the relation
between  and . So ((B;);) is a pair, consisting of an epistemic interpreted
algebra and a maximal consistent set of propositional sentences, that satisﬁes m
and thus .

Proof of Theorem 5. Soundness is straightforward. For completeness, consider ,
a consistent set of sentences LKA+ 
P . Take a maximal consistent extension m, and
construct ((B;);) using the LKA
P -fragment of m as in the proof of Theorem 4.
By considering the set f  j [+]  2 mg for each , and using the same technique
as in the proof of Theorem 4, construct pairs of interpreted epistemic algebras and
maximal consistent sets of propositional letters for each  2 LKA
P ; similarly for
narrowing. It remains to show that, for any , the pair constructed is the result of
applying the appropriate expansion (resp. narrowing) operations.
Consider just expansion; the case of narrowing is similar and simpler. Take an
arbitrary , and let ((B;);) be the pair constructed, as described above, using
f  j [+]  2 mg. + prop, + ^ and + : guarantee that  = . It follows from + A
and A1 – A4 that B = B + p1 +  + pn, for  = fp1;:::; png. + K implies that
 )B  and that, for each   2 B such that  ;B  ,  )B :K(  _ ), for 
any Boolean combination of elements of P in  but not in B. Since  )B K,
it follows that  ;B   _  for such   and . So  is the conjunction of  with
all such :K(  _ ), and thus ((B;);) = ((B;);) + p1 +  + pn.

Proof of Theorem 6. Only the case of extension need be considered, since the oth-
ers have been dealt with above. Soundness is straightforward. For completeness,
consider , a consistent set of sentences LKA+ 
P ; take a maximal consistent exten-
sion m, and construct ((B;);) using the LKA
P -fragment of m as in the proof of
Theorem 4. For an arbitrary , consider the set f  j [+]  2 mg and construct
a pair ((B;);) consisting of an interpreted epistemic algebra and a maximal
consistent set of propositional letters as follows. Take  to be the set of proposi-
tional elements   such that [+]  2 m; since the latter is maximally consistent,
the former is as well. Let I = fp 2 P j [+]Ap 2 mg, and  be the supremum of
f  2 BI n BIj [+]K:  2 mg. Let B = (BI; B;q), where BI is the epistemic
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algebra generated by I and B is the quotient by  (with q the quotient map).30
Finally, let  be the inﬁmum of f j [+]K  2 mg. By the reasoning in the proof
of Theorem 4, this is a well-deﬁned knowledge element.
Note the following properties of ((B;);). By + prop, + ^ and + :,  =
. It follows from + A and A1 – A4 and the construction of B that there is an
embedding of B into B; in fact, it follows that B = B + p1 +  + pn= (recall
that  = fp1;:::; png). Finally, it follows from +ext K that  )B . However, by
construction,  )B , so  is the image of  in the embedding. Thus (B;)
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